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Groucho Marx once told an audience that before he would begin to 
speak, he had something important to say. On the face of it, this decla-
ration describes rather precisely what it means to write a preface: You 
state some introductory or clarifying remarks before moving on to 
the actual subject at hand. Groucho’s expression has a certain comical 
effect, however, because it also postulates a rather paradoxical ability: 
being able to “say” something before, and thus without, “speaking”, as 
if there is a saying that is somehow qualitatively different from speak-
ing. But how can you say anything without speaking? By miming it? 
And what does it mean for that which follows? Is speaking somehow 
less than saying something, or, on the contrary, the only case where 
anything really gets across at all?
A preface contains a similarly asymmetric relation to the text it intro-
duces. It states something that is not really part of the text itself, but 
has to be stated before the actual writing begins. Sometimes, a pref-
ace can solemnly summarize a work’s world-historical significance, 
like when Wittgenstein in the preface of the Tractatus claimed to have 
“solved the problems of philosophy and shown how little was thereby 
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accomplished”1. At other times, it is the preface which is profane or 
immaterial, giving only dull information about the bureaucratic con-
ditions of the appearance of the text.
In any case, the expression “before I speak, I have something import-
ant to say” shows something about an urgency of getting the opening 
right, of approaching the text in the right manner. The preface often 
exhibits something about the kind of work, and the kind of author, 
you are about to read, as well as how you are meant to receive it. The 
preface is a genre of its own, and one that has been interpreted differ-
ently by different authors. In this article, I want to approach the way 
this genre has been interpreted in philosophy and more specifically, 
how it was used by Søren Kierkegaard. The first point to notice is 
that Kierkegaard’s prefaces are different from most of the prefaces met 
with in philosophy. This difference is not merely trivial. The second 
point is that the prefaces tell a particular story about Kierkegaard’s 
authorship – one which gives a slightly different twist on the “thera-
peutic” or “midwife” status, it is often attributed. Kierkegaard’s writ-
ing represents a kind of labour that must be worked through by both 
the author and the reader, and his prefaces are a crucial element in the 
staging and development of this labour throughout the authorship. 
But before I start speaking about that, I want to say a little bit more 
about prefaces in general.
MY LOVING AND PATIENT WIFE
Most prefaces in academic writing today clearly separate themselves 
from the body of the text they introduce. They represent a kind of 
mapping of the work, placing it in space and time, by for example de-
scribing the generous institutions that have hosted the author during 
his or her work; acknowledging the invaluable assistance of colleagues 
and students; thanking sponsors – and, not least, the family of the 
author (“my loving and patient wife, without whom this would never 
have been possible”). On some occasions, they also include a mapping 
of the context of the work itself, in terms of e.g. what inspired the 
author to take up this particular topic, where current research has left 
some questions unanswered, etc. Most of this rhetoric, I think, could 
be described as an elaborate form of fake modesty: By thanking and 
acknowledging certain institutions and individuals, I simultaneous-
ly show myself as the one, who is placed right in the middle of this 
formidable network of relations. It is the heroism of the university 
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discourse, to use the Lacanian term. The gesture of disavowing the 
status of a lonely Master or a genius simultaneously elevates the au-
thor as a little prince or princess in the field of knowledge; someone 
who “could not have made it” without all the help of the surround-
ings, but who, by emphasizing this, precisely underscores that he or 
she has indeed made it. The work itself, on the other hand, after such an 
introduction, can stand for itself. It is a finished piece of scholarship 
that will be inserted into the chain of science, having been objectively 
verified by its very publication (in a journal or at a publishing house 
that automatically grants value, even economic value, to the work).  
In a classic work of philosophy prefaces would often have almost the 
opposite characteristics: a complete lack of modesty in the sense of 
claiming to be addressing the truth of the matter directly and no, or 
very limited, efforts to situate oneself within the current social and ac-
ademic structures. Nonetheless, a classic preface might contain anoth-
er, and maybe even more genuine form of modesty: I, the author, am 
humbly expressing, what I believe to be “the eternal laws of thought”, 
but others may come, who will surpass my insights and ability to ex-
press them. In the preface to his Theodicy, for example, Leibniz speaks 
unapologetically of true piety, the intentions of Jesus Christ, freedom 
and evil, among other things, but then closes by saying that 
If, moreover, any error has crept into the ideas expressed, the 
author will be the first to correct it, once he has been better in-
formed: he has given elsewhere such indications of his love of 
truth that he hopes this declaration will not be regarded as mere-
ly an empty phrase2. 
Kant opens the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason by describ-
ing how human reason has the peculiar destiny to be “burdened with 
questions, which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as prob-
lems by the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, 
since they transcend every capacity of human reason”3. Mapping “the 
nature of reason itself” is certainly no small task, humble as the author 
may be. Hegel’s preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit famously, or in-
famously, concerns the very beginning of philosophy, and it is really a 
preface about the impossibility of writing a preface, as Mladen Dolar 
has described it: Stating in a few, general sentences what one wishes 
to achieve in the work ahead is meaningless, because such statements 
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are empty and abstract, without the actual content of that which they 
are promising. Hegel writes:
 
For the real issue is not exhausted by stating it as an aim, but by 
carrying it out, nor is the result the actual whole, but rather the 
results together with the process through which it came about. 
The aim by itself is a lifeless universal, just as the guiding ten-
dency is a mere drive that as yet lacks an actual existence; and 
the bare result is the corpse which has left the guiding tendency 
behind it4. 
Although one could therefore argue that Hegel writes a preface to de-
construct the very idea of a preface (including such written by Leibniz 
and Kant), he does in fact still earnestly write a preface about (noth-
ing less than) the nature of philosophy, and he still remains within 
the classic frames of approaching truth boldly and unapologetically; if 
anything, even more so than his predecessors. The question is not how 
he, the unsalaried professor from Jena, could contribute to the scienc-
es, but how philosophy itself could come about its own actualisation. 
If anything characterizes Søren Kierkegaard as a philosopher, it could 
certainly be said to be his blatant disrespect for such solemn declara-
tions of the aims of philosophy or an author’s contribution to the ad-
vance of science. Instead, the prefaces, which Kierkegaard wrote, often 
concern the relation between the author and the text, or between the 
author and the reader, often creating an ironic twist to the status of 
the text itself: How should we read this, as the position of whom? And 
on which authority does the text really rely?
Kierkegaard’s keen interest in the genre of the preface is emphatically 
displayed by the fact that he wrote an entire book containing only 
prefaces – and entitled “Forord” (which in Danish could be read as 
both the singular and the plural of “preface”). The book was published 
in 1844 under the pseudonym of Nicolaus Notabene and contains a 
collection of prefaces written by Notabene, who had become an au-
thor exclusively of prefaces, because of a compromise he had allegedly 
reached with his wife. She had forbidden him to become an author, 
since being a writer, to her, constituted “downright unfaithfulness” 
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in violation of the vows of marriage (Kierkegaard 2009: 10)i. As a 
consolation, instead of writing full-length volumes, Notabene would 
be allowed to write prefaces of books that he could then envision as 
figments of his imagination. The irony, one among many in this work, 
being of course that in this way he actually managed to write a whole 
book, consisting entirely of prefaces. The topics of the prefaces vary, 
but it would be fair to say that they deconstruct the very idea of a 
“preface to philosophy” in a much more straightforward sense than 
Hegel’s preface to the Phenomenology. For example: The first of Nota-
bene’s prefaces (apart from the preface to Prefaces), is a mockery of J. 
L. Heiberg and contemporary Danish Hegelianism. In it, the author 
promises to realize a plan that has been developed over 30 years and 
deliver a system, the publication of which will mean that the succeed-
ing generations will not even have to learn how to write; “because 
there will be nothing more to write, but only to read – the system”5.
Apart from containing several such parodies of real and imagined fig-
ures, the book, and especially its preface, excels in a range of lively and 
satirical metaphors for the very endeavour of writing a preface:
Writing a preface is like sharpening a scythe, like tuning a guitar, 
like talking with a child, like spitting out of the window. […] 
Writing a preface is like ringing someone’s doorbell to trick him, 
like walking by a young Lady’s window and gazing at the paving 
stones; it is like swinging one’s cane in the air to hit the wind, 
like doffing one’s hat although one is greeting nobody6.
Although such witty and suggestive prose does indicate a well-known 
anti-systematic, if not outright anti-philosophical stance in Kierkeg-
aard, his fascination with prefaces, I think, does not restrict itself to 
satire or poking fun at traditional philosophy. The preface is a genre 
of its own that is explored in Kierkegaard’s writings, and it takes on 
a number of different functions, not only in the book Prefaces, but 
throughout his authorship. Kierkegaard was “ringing the reader’s 
doorbell”, if you will, sometimes indeed to leave a package without 
any trace of its origin, sometimes just to let the reader see a shadow 
i  I rely on the English translation of Prefaces, as well as of The Concept of 
Anxiety. Other references to Kierkegaard’s works are to the standard edition 
from the Kierkegaard Research Center (SKS), in my own translation.
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disappear around the corner, and sometimes in disguise, but some-
times also simply with a well meant apology for the interference and 
best wishes for the reader’s engagement with the questions that the 
book would address.
PREFACES OTHER THAN PREFACES
The prefaces in Kierkegaard’s work are almost always witty, but al-
though they might sometimes seem like mere ironic gestures, they do 
serve functions that relate to the very idea of authorship and the aim 
of Kierkegaard’s writing. Although they separate themselves from the 
work and often undermine the expectation of a unified and unprob-
lematic authorial voice, they also stich the work together, stage it, and 
even create liaisons to other authors and other works in Kierkegaard’s 
oeuvre.
Some deconstructive readings of Kierkegaard tend to overemphasize 
the ironic gestures and subversive mirroring of other positions to such 
a degree that they end up rejecting any bit of “constructive” reading, 
i.e. readings that try to extract philosophical points and questions from 
the text. Paradoxically, such insistence on the subversive, polyphonic, 
ironic, etc. gestures in Kierkegaard, at times end up celebrating the 
ingenious masterplan of the biographical author, Søren Kierkegaard 
– the shrewd plan to deconstruct and undermine any coherent posi-
tion in philosophy. The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard’s university dis-
sertation, for example, is read by Roger Poole as the “opportunity he 
needed to subvert the literary forms of the tyrants who would be his 
examiners”7, while The Concept of Anxiety is not really about anxiety at 
all, but rather: “the whole thing is likely to be a disrespectful ironic 
joke”8. Stuart Dalton, who is a keen reader of Kierkegaard’s prefaces, 
has made a clear and strong point in showing how there are always 
both too many entrances and too many exits to Kierkegaard’s writing 
to claim that there is one unified position that he meant to defend 
(there is the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, but also The Point of View 
of My Work as an Author and My Activity as a Writer, both of which have 
separate supplements that might be considered as concluding post-
scripts in their own right): “By writing more than one beginning and 
ending for his indirect communication, and by writing his beginnings 
and endings in a very particular way, Kierkegaard anticipated the de-
mand that the present age (both his and ours) would make for a sys-
tematic, totalized, conveniently packaged and easily digestible version 
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of his unruly and ill-behaved texts, and he derailed that helpful un-
dertaking before it even got started”9. Although this is certainly a val-
id point, Dalton too ends up celebrating Kierkegaard’s unambiguous 
intentions in an almost complete mirroring of the monological and 
theological readings that he opposes. The little text My Activity as a 
Writer contains the statement often adhered to by theological readers 
of Kierkegaard, that the purpose of the whole authorship was religious 
from beginning to end10. Instead of reading this and other parts of the 
text carefully for the insights they may contain, however, Dalton cel-
ebrates the text as the ultimate proof of the opposite of what it says: 
“By publishing My Activity as a Writer in his lifetime he tapped into 
all the traditional expectations that the public has concerning writers 
and their relationship to their work, and he used this massive body of 
stereotypes to create a new personage: a pseudonym named ‘Søren 
Kierkegaard’. This was the last and best defence available to Kierkeg-
aard both to protect his own independence, the independence of the 
text, and the independence of the reader – all of which were crucial to 
him”11.
Deconstructive readings of Kierkegaard sometimes tend towards the 
hysterical, again in the sense of Lacan’s four discourses, since they 
read any sign as evidence for the defamation of the master or “tradi-
tional philosophy”. No wonder that the truth of this position is the 
enjoyment of exposing the inconsistencies in any supposedly coher-
ent position. The hysteric, however, secretly wants the master to re-
main master, (in order to be able to sustain the hysteric’s enjoyment) 
and this could maybe be part of the explanation of the deconstructive 
celebration of Kierkegaard, the genius author. Kierkegaard, himself, 
certainly had his hysterical moments as well, but what I want to sug-
gest is that his work might more productively be read in terms of the 
discourse of the analyst: Someone working to articulate that which 
does not make itself easily available; which is not preconfigured in any 
readymade speech or set of beliefs; and which can only be brought for-
ward through a patient and diverse approach of experimentation and 
deliberation. The work to be done is to bring something into view, 
which is not immediately clear – or to make it possible to make the 
text “look back” at the reader and ask questions, rather than giving 
answers. This certainly does include a critical and ironic approach, 
when compared to traditional philosophy, but it nonetheless contains 
certain clearly philosophical points and directions.
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To that end, let us have a more careful look at some of the prefaces to 
Kierkegaard’s (other) works. In the very first work from 1838 (From 
the Papers of One still Living), which was published even before his dis-
sertation, Kierkegaard added a short preface with a rather remarkable 
content. The book is published in his own name, albeit “against his 
will”, as the subtitle reads, and from the first sentence of the preface, 
an alter ego is introduced, to whom Kierkegaard refers as the “actual 
author of this dissertation”. This other character is a “double” much 
like those found in novels or dramas in various forms. The relation 
between Kierkegaard and the actual author is thusly described: “we 
are often opposed to each other like magnets, but strictly inseparable, 
although our common acquaintances have only rarely, maybe not at 
all, seen us together, even if some of them may have wondered how, 
just as they have left one of us, almost simultaneously run into the 
other”12. The two are like “two souls in one body” and opposed also 
in the sense that the “actual author” is very much at unease in this 
world, while Søren Kierkegaard, the publisher, seems to be a more 
pragmatic and less pedantic writer. Indeed, according to the preface, 
once the book had finally been finished, the actual author wanted to 
retract it and cancel the whole thing, which was avoided only by a firm 
decision by his friend to take command and declare: “Straight ahead. 
Marche. The parole is: What I wrote, I wrote”13. So, from the very be-
ginning of the authorship, some other, a friend, an alter ego, is speak-
ing through Kierkegaard, who sees himself as the medium for the ma-
terialization of the discourse of this Other and who can only claim a 
formal responsibility for the publication of the text as it appears in the 
end. This relationship between the “actual author” and Kierkegaard 
echoes throughout the oeuvre, even if it undergoes a transformation, 
including in fact in the short text on My Activity as a Writer from 1849, 
which was mentioned before, where the emphasis on the Christian 
aim of the authorship is qualified by the addition that Kierkegaard 
himself was “without authority” in this endeavour: “That I was ‘with-
out authority’, I have made clear and repeated from the first moment; 
I rather consider myself as a reader of the books, not as their author”14.
In Either-Or, the figure of the double is replaced by a more elaborate 
construction, which does not include the same explicit split between 
Kierkegaard himself and the “actual author(s)”, but rather leaves Ki-
erkegaard out of the picture altogether. The texts that constitute the 
body of the work are written by characters that are not only others 
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to Kierkegaard, but also to a publisher, who is himself a pseudonym 
– one Victor Eremita, who is also the author of the preface. In it, Ere-
mita tells the story about how he found the manuscripts inside a desk 
that he had bought second hand, and he tells the reader of his lifelong 
occupation with the investigation of the “known philosophical prop-
osition” that the inner and the outer are the same. (A sentence, which 
seems to refer to Hegel’s Philosophy of History.) Eremita is of the clear 
conviction that the two are not the same, and he finds corroboration 
for this thesis in the manuscripts of the book, just as he has found it 
in talking to people he met, always curious to find out, whether what 
they disclose about themselves when talking matches how they appear 
on the outside. Eremita is a listener, silently accompanying the text 
that ensues in the body of the work. He hears what A. and B. have to 
say, and he is confirmed in his general impression that people tend not 
to cohere entirely with what they show “on the outside”. It is almost 
as if Kierkegaard is installing an analyst; someone who receives the 
discourse of the (very talkative) protagonists in the book, while Ki-
erkegaard himself is set at a distance, one step further away, from the 
words that he inscribes in the papers.  
In the major pseudonymous works following after Either-Or, the pref-
ace is generally written by the same author as the work itself (except 
Repetition, which does not have a preface). These prefaces do resemble 
those of classical philosophical works more, but the authors all seem 
to take care in denouncing themselves as philosophers, learned peo-
ple or true believers, and rather emphasize their humble attempts at 
expressing thoughts that are almost beyond their grasp (this is most 
clearly the case with Fear and Trembling, where Johannes de Silentio is 
struggling to make sense of the story about Abraham and Isaac). Vig-
ilius Haufniensis, in The Concept of Anxiety, makes use of the preface 
to declare his readiness to take on a much less presumptuous name 
(“Christian Madsen”, for example), in case anyone would be offended 
by the Latin one that he carries. For his own part, he seems to care 
very little for outward signs of dignity or authority, mockingly stating 
that: “When it comes to human authority, I am a fetish worshipper 
and will worship anyone with equal piety, but with one proviso, that 
it be made sufficiently clear by a beating of drums that he is the one 
I must worship and that it is he who is the authority and Imprima-
tur for the current year. The decision is beyond my understanding, 
whether it takes place by lottery or balloting, or whether the honor is 
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passed around so that each individual has his turn as authority, like a 
representation of the burghers on the board of arbitration [“ligesom 
en Borger-Repræsentant sidder i Forligelses-Commissionen”]..15. In 
Sickness unto Death, Anti-Climacus admits that his work could in some 
sense have been written by a common student, but in another sense, it 
might not have been possible by just any professor (probably because 
professors precisely tend to let their status and authority get in the 
way of expressing themselves clearly to the point). In various ways, the 
pseudonymous authors stand by the words of their treatises, but they 
deny themselves (or indeed anybody) a privileged position in relation 
to the matter at hand. They almost annul themselves in order for the 
text itself to speak to its reader.
In other words: In the early works something seemed to announce 
itself in Kierkegaard’s writing, which almost went ahead of the author 
or required him to stage the writing in an elaborate way to find the 
appropriate form of its articulation, whereas in the bulk of the pseud-
onymous works, the staging found a more stable form that made it 
possible to let the pen flow and let “it” speak without too much in-
terruption by the publisher or the “legally responsible”. After 1846, 
when the pseudonymous work was completed (or so it is described 
in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript from that year, although pseud-
onyms are still employed in the following years), a period with more 
ambiguity again emerges, but this time with less focus on how the au-
thor conceived the text, than on how it is to be received by the reader.
LISTEN TO YOURSELF!
It is a curious biographical fact that Kierkegaard was very keen on 
reading his text aloud, even several times, before he would accept 
its formulation. Almost as if the text was first of all supposed to be 
heard before it could be said to have been formulated aright. In this 
sense, the examination of that voice or address, which accompanied 
Kierkegaard throughout his work, bears an almost literal resemblance 
to psychoanalysis: You need to hear your voice reflected through the 
medium of an Other, before you can relate to it again, or maybe even 
relate to it for the first time. Writing, to Kierkegaard, was not a matter 
of inscribing knowledge into the great chain of science, nor certainly 
to teach his readers how to live a good, Christian life, but much more 
a way of articulating thoughts, letting them undergo the labour of lan-
guage, in order to explicate them and investigate them – to hear what 
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was in them as it were.  Most of Kierkegaard’s philosophical work is 
mediated through the pseudonym, who would be the transmitter and 
catalyst of that which was to be thought. Like reading aloud, such a 
constellation makes it possible to apprehend one’s own words as spo-
ken by… Eremita, de Silentio, Haufniensis, etc. Kierkegaard, in other 
words, was creating an analytical setting, which made it possible for 
the author to turn into a reader of his own thoughts. This setting was 
continuously experimented with, and it found a number of different 
forms throughout the oeuvre. If there is a plan or a point of view of 
such an authorship, it must clearly be one that makes itself apparent, 
as the work proceeds, much rather than one, which is preconceived 
or clear to the author from the beginning. As Kierkegaard says in My 
Activity as a Writer, after having declared that the aim of the entire 
authorship was religious: “That is how I understand it all now; from 
the beginning I have not been able to overview, what has also been my 
own development”16.
Similarly, Kierkegaard also thought that the best way for the reader 
to receive the text would be to actually read it aloud. In this way, the 
reader would repeat the active gesture of the author, literally giving 
the text his or her own voice, but s/he would thereby simultaneous-
ly be repeating the gesture of externalization or even alienation that 
comes along with such a reading out loud. Receiving the text thus does 
not mean passively acquiring knowledge or insight from its author, 
but rather participating in the riddle or wonder that the text produces. 
Kierkegaard himself was a reader of his own work in this sense – pre-
cisely when the text succeeded in producing something, which the au-
thor could not have anticipated, or which would continue to demand 
reflection, even if it could be stated seemingly simply.
In Practice in Christianity from 1850, “S.K.” makes a short appearance 
with a preface that introduces to the work, which is authored by An-
ti-Climacus. Here he, S.K., remarks about the book that the demand 
of being a Christian, in his opinion, has been forced to its highest ideal 
by the pseudonymous author, and that he furthermore understands 
what is being said, as addressed to himself (S.K.). “The demand should 
be heard; and I understand the stated as stated to me alone”17. It is 
almost as if the thoughts expressed have finally reached their desti-
nation: Kierkegaard himself.  Whereas Victor Eremita patiently lis-
tened to the colourful fragments of A. and the pious declarations of 
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B. (mostly just to confirm his thesis that nothing is what it appears to 
be), S.K. now acknowledges a specific address in the later work, even 
an “ideal”, and he sees himself as the addressee. 
ANALYST OR ANALYSAND?
What the prefaces show is that Kierkegaard seems to have undergone a 
change through his authorship. From the “hysterization” of the writer 
in the beginning to the ability, finally, towards the end, to hear what 
he himself has written. If Kierkegaard’s work should be compared to 
the process of a psychoanalysis, it seems that it must be the reader who 
is the analyst. The “singular individual”, who is invoked on a number 
of occasions, seems to be the one to whom the speech is addressed, and 
who returns it for the speaker himself to hear. Maybe the call to the 
reader, the plea for his attention, “even if there is only one”, is not so 
much a hope for the social impact (as it is unfortunately called today) 
that Kierkegaard might achieve, but much rather the reassurance of 
the minimal structure of address for the discourse to function. The 
reader is a wall that reflects the voice of the author and makes it pos-
sible for him to hear it himself. This does not mean that Kierkegaard 
was uninterested in his actual reader, certainly not. Indeed, he was 
intensely occupied by the effect, his text would have. But it means 
that the effect from the text should not be understood as a transfer of 
knowledge or insight from the author to the reader. Instead, what the 
reader was supposed to do, was to read the text, as if it were her own 
words, preferably aloud, and thereby relate to it with the same kind of 
distance as its author. If there is a “therapeutic” effect from such an 
effort, it consists not in having learned anything, but in having heard 
oneself articulate the human condition and received this articulation 
back in its true, inverted form.   
1  Parafrasing Wittgenstein: ”Ich bin also der Meinung, die Probleme im 
  Wesentlichen endgültig gelöst zu haben. Und wenn ich mich hierin 
  nicht irre, so besteht nun der Wert dieser Arbeit zweitens darin,
  dass sie zeigt, wie wenig damit getan ist, dass diese Probleme gelöst
  sind” (Wittgenstein 1993: 10).
2  Leibniz 1990: 72
3  Kant 1998: 99, A VII.
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